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INTRODUCTION
Deregulation of the airline industry in the US was the harbinger of similar moves in a
number of OECD countries. The purveyors of deregulation point out that in the US, air
carriers have achieved efficiency, cost reduction, and pricing innovations (Barrett 1992).
The industry witnessed an increase in the number of airlines, an expansion of feeder services
and increased consumer choice. In th  mid 1980s, the industry started exhibiting signs of
concentration. There are fears that the increasing oligopoly profile is gnawing away at the
benefits brought about by deregulation. The realisation that deregulation of the industry
confers more benefits than the converse has seen the pro-deregulation lobby move to the
international aviation scene. Arguments for the creation of single aviation markets are
premised on the benefits that derive from deregulation. Liberalisation of bilateral
agreements and the creation of single aviation markets are currently the industry’s fad. In
1993 Europe will become a single market; Canada and the US are moving towards an
“open skies” arrangement; Australia and New Zealand are set to fashion out an Australasian
single market; the Andean countries are forming their own; the members of the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are exploring the option and
West Africa’s Air Afrique’s operations and the underlying bilaterals have the mark of a
single aviation market.
Single aviation markets are said to be the natural extension of deregulated domestic
markets. As such, the rationale for their birth may be steeped in contestability theory. In
some cases the calculation of welfare benefits assumed to flow out of these markets is
based on the assumption that the threat of entry by new airlines will goad the incumbents to
behave in a welfare maximising manner. Contestability theory has in this regard been the
bedrock for policy formulation and regulatory procedure. The theme of this paper is that
whilst deregulation has a number of benefits, using contestability theory to formulate
competition policy in single aviation markets has pitfalls to be avoided. We argue that the
welfare benefits may a priori be overstated and policy makers should seriously turn their
attention to the barriers to entry both within and outside of the markets. The latter falls
more under the domain of trade policy than micro economic policy. We do, however, give
it some attention in this paper.
The paper begins by briefly looking at the theory of contestable markets as it relates to the
aviation industry, particularly its contribution to the deregulation argument and subsequent
extension to single aviation markets. The shortcomings of the theory are looked at, before
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proceeding to examine the barriers to entry and operation within/without common aviation
markets. The policy and welfare implications of using contestability theory are then
examined.
CONTESTABILITY THEORY - WHAT ARE ITS PRESCRIPTIONS ?
Conventional normative economics looks at the number of sellers and buyers in the market
to determine the keenness of competition. Contestability theory on the other hand discounts
the “numbers theory” and puts emphasis on potential entry into a market. A perfectly
contestable market is one in which entry is absolutely costless. In such a market all firms are
forced to behave as if they were in a perfectly competitive situation, irrespective of their
actual number, their scale of production and capital requirements. The driving force which
ensures that they do so is the threat of costless reversible entry (Baumol et al. 1982). For
the costless reversible entry result to hold, three conditions are necessary:
• On the production side, both entrant and incumbent must be symmetrically placed,
being subject to the same regulations, having access to technology of the same
vintage, and being perceived to produce outputs of similar quality.
• In the technology of production, sunk costs must be absent. This is likely
whenever the capital employed is reusable or when production can be sub-
contracted.
• The pricing practices in the market must be such as to prevent responsive pricing
by incumbents. This will be true if consumers respond to price differences with a
shorter reaction time than do incumbents, or else if entrants are able to secure
contracts with customers so as to allow a period of positive profit before possibly
retiring.
When these conditions are satisfied, allocative efficiency, x-efficiency and zero profits will
result. Where they obtain, there would be observation of hit and run entry, large-scale entry
and nullified monopolies or dominant firms.
Much standard analysis of the determining output and prices takes the structure of
particular industries to be determined outside the domain of the analysis, in effect to be
imposed by the fates in a manner that requires no explanation (Baumol et al. 1982). In
contestability theory, the structure is determined endogenously and simultaneously with the
vectors of industry output and prices. In oligopolistic and imperfect competition, the
players have to be always on the look-out for the strategic manoeuvres of opponents. In
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contestable markets, players are not troubled by these problems of indeterminancy and
competitive variations, and surmises about competitors’ reactions play little or no overt
role. The behaviour of potential entrants provides the determinancy and their behaviour can
be a natural response to the freedom of both entry and exit.
Central to the theory is the height of entry and exit barriers. An entry barrier can be present
when the potential entrants face costs greater than those incurred by a firm now incumbent
in the industry. Another definition would be that entry barriers are an impediment to the
flow of resources into the industry arising as a result of socially excessive protection of
incumbent firms. In effect, a barrier is an undefined object whose presence is to be judged
only in terms of the undesirable consequences for social welfare. Davies (1986) says that
there has been confusion in the minds of contemporary students of the airline industry over
how to evaluate the impact of instances of entry. He goes further to assert that this
confusion seems to also affect the work of Baumol. Baumol et al. (1982:446) state that the
most obvious indicator of contestability is “a history of frequent entry and exit”. Yet
elsewhere Baumol et al. (1982) assert that an absence of entry does not in itself imply that
an industry is not highly contestable, for it may be the consequence of competitive pricing
which would make profitable entry impossible: it may thus be a symptom of “virtue not of
vice” (Baumol et al. 1982:446). It would appear therefore that the authors of the theory
perceived a history of frequent entry and exit to be a sufficient but not necessary
demonstration of contestability which may also occur in the absence of such a history under
an appropriate technological and business environment.
The theory of contestability hypothesised that in aviation, carriers could not behave
uncompetitively because entry into an airline market was reversible and aircraft could easily
be moved between different sets of city pairs. Baumol et al. (1982) argued that the theory
had two major policy implications for the role of the regulatory authorities. On market
entry, they warn of the questionable desirability of artificial impediments to entry that
regulators were long inclined to impose. Contestability theory puts forward the view that
any proposed barrier to entry must start off with a heavy presumption against adoption.
Some industries with a small number of firms are highly contestable. In other cases the
contestability of the market can be increased by public policy, and in those cases, this will
sometimes prove to be the most efficient means to serve public interest. Prior to
deregulation most city-pair markets were served by one airline and it was expected that this
would remain the case. An argument (contestability) was required which would dismiss this
as a concern. They thus recommend that the aviation regulators had to use contestability
theory to analyse the industry.
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In perfectly contestable markets, social welfare is maximised. Firms produce at the lowest
cost and inefficiencies are eliminated. Those firms that cannot are pushed out by new
entrants who can do so at lower cost. Consumers benefit from low fares, optimal schedules
and frequencies. Generally, the industry becomes both allocatively and productively
efficient. The division of the total industry output among its firms must minimise the
industry’s total production costs. Moreover, for a configuration to be efficient (sustainable)
if at least two firms produce the same good, then its price must equal its marginal costs
(Baumol et al. 1982).
The concept of sustainability is the analytic device (compared to concentration ratios and
the Herfindahl index) that summarises the proclivities for a certain type of market conduct.
It is designed to describe an equilibrium vis-a-vis potential entrants who take as
(temporarily) fixed the prices of incumbent firms. The point being made is that in the
absence of exogenous changes, if incumbents adopt prices sustainable against entry, then in
principle they need never resort to strategic price responses and counter moves in order to
prevent profitable entry opportunities.
The airline industry in the US was seen to provide a suitable testing ground for
contestability theory. Arguments for deregulation were premised on the theory. Even with
subsequent consolidation in the industry, some experts are still of the view that the industry
bears the marks of contestability. The pro-single market lobby in the Andean and US-
Canada common markets has used contestability theory to develop their argument. The
problem with such arguments is that the theory tends to appear synonymous with
deregulation. The welfare benefits derived from a deregulated airline industry are made out
to be a justification for contestability theory. The theory has been used, though not as
vigorously, to put forward arguments for single aviation markets. We turn briefly to look at
the short-comings of contestability theory as it relates to aviation.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THEORY - WHAT THE JURY SAYS
There appears to be some empirical evidence that the number of competitors on any route
does have an impact on the price levels (Graham, Kaplan and Sibley 1983). Morrison and
Winston found that:
“... a combination of some version of the dominant firm model and imperfect contestability
seems to characterise competition in the deregulated airline industry” (Morrison and Winston
1986:64).
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William and Kessides (1991), in a study on localised market power in the US airline
industry, found that the bulk of any deviation from contestability in the airline industry is
associated with airports rather than routes. Their findings suggest that the two sources most
commonly suggested as the root cause of localised market power, scarce airport facilities
and airline ownership of CRSs, only augment an already existent market power.
Alamdari (1989) gives a checklist against which to evaluate contestability theory. On the
question of sunk costs, she asserts that it is not realistic to assume that because aircraft are
transferable from one route to another, then there are no sunk costs. Entrants need to
acquire gates, landing slots, advertising, pay travel agents commission, etc. She asserts that
it seems intuitively obvious that airlines serving airports where the factors of production are
particularly in short supply enjoy some protection from entry. In this regard, the “equal
access to the productive techniques” requirement of the theory does not pass the test.
Morrison and Winston (1987) point out that entry into a new market requires that a carrier
already has some presence in the market by serving at least one of the relevant airports.
Otherwise carriers require time and must absorb sunk costs to obtain gate space and
establish patronage.
Predatory pricing does take place and new entrants have to absorb these costs - they thus
need a “fighting fund”. On international routes flag carriers may receive government
support. The operation of CRSs and the type of contracts between the owners of the
system and the travel agents in the US have proved that perfect information in the airline
industry is not achievable.
Sinha (1986) has reviewed the literature on contestability of airline markets and has
revealed diverse opinions among economists on the subject. Sinha (1986) reports that
Bailey and Panzar at first argued that city-pair markets were perfectly contestable but later
supported the theory only partially. Call and Keeler (1985) in their empirical studies on the
industry have shown that various measures of efficiency (for example the price-cost ratio)
depend on the number of actual competitors. Shepherd (1984) argued that recourse to
contestability was unnecessary. Shepherd (1984:585) also notes that “airline competition
can be explained by well established concepts of market structure and entry”.
Morrison and Winston (1987) concluded that transport in general is not perfectly
contestable. But most importantly Morrison and Winston (1987:67) conclude that
“potential entry may still affect welfare although this does not drive markets to welfare
maximisation”. They call this a case of imperfect contestability. Leigh concludes:
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“It seems that attempts to apply contestability theory to deregulated airline markets do not
offer better predictive validity than more traditional models of industrial organisation” (Leigh
1990:55).
He asserts that the development of hub-and-spoke networks provides carriers with the
opportunity to exercise a degree of market power by existing firms and to erect barriers to
the entry of potential new ones - both things that contestability theory said they could not
do. Besides, new entrants have defied conventional wisdom by designing networks in the
not so dense routes. Entry and exit into individual city-pair markets does not appear to
conform to the random, instantaneous and reversible response to opportunities for earning
supernormal profits that would be consistent with pure contestability. Leigh says:
“If it fails to prove its usefulness there, then one wonders if contestability may not be
relegated to being an intellectual "curiosum" the stringency of whose assumptions prevent it
from having much real world application” (Leigh 1990:56).
THE THEORY AND SINGLE AVIATION MARKETS
Barrett (1992) formally links contestability theory to single aviation markets. He argues that
deregulation of market access in the European market will leave unaddressed other barriers
to contestability in the deregulated European market. He talks of structural and strategic
barriers to contestability. Gillen et al. (1990) in a paper on liberalising the Canada-US air
transport agreement bilateral allude to contestability theory in their proposed solutions.
Clough and O’Donovan (1989) in a study on Australia-New Zealand air services
liberalisation actually modelled welfare benefits using contestability theory to capture the
likely welfare consequences of “strong threat[s] of entry”. They assert that:
“Non-rail transport industries like airlines, with minimal sunk costs in infrastructure and
active market on which to buy and dispose of equipment, conform to most requirements of
this theory. The dominant airlines might therefore reduce their average fares by 10% to ward
off a serious threat of entry, and seek to reduce their own costs by 10% to maintain their
current profitability” (Clough and O’Donovan 1989:61).
Even in the absence of a likely new entrant into a market, the incumbent operators may
make pre-emptive adjustments to their fare and services offerings to reduce the
opportunities for a prospective new operator.
We would argue that when modelling possible welfare gains from a single aviation market
the prevailing industry structure and the most likely after the event scenarios should be
uppermost. Modelling on the basis of contestability theory may not bring out optimal
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results - it should be used as a remote rather than most likely scenario. Basing decisions on
contestability of the aviation market may distort the results. We turn now to the barriers to
contestability in single aviation markets with a view to suggesting how these may be
lowered or removed.
BARRIERS TO CONTESTABILITY IN SINGLE AVIATION MARKETS
Barrett (1992) identifies two types of barriers to contestability in single aviation markets;
structural and strategic. He deals mostly with those obstacles that are to be found in
Europe. Different markets would naturally have their peculiarities.
The structural barriers include hub airport dominance, ground handling monopolies and
computer reservation systems. The strategic barriers would include mergers and pricing
policy. Several analyses of the US aviation industry have found important barriers to
contestability albeit within a policy change which remains a substantial net benefit to the US
economy as a whole. If these barriers to contestability prevent new entry, a major
assumption underlying the theory is invalidated.
STRUCTURAL BARRIERS
The importance of network effects
Leigh (1990) asserts that probably the most important source of non-contestability may be
found in the dramatic changes to route network structure that characterised the post
deregulation period in the US. One of the principal ways that airlines have protected
themselves against the threat of potential entry implied by contestability theory is through
the development of hub-and-spoke route networks.
In the case of the Canada-US single market, Gillen et al. (1990) find that Canadian airlines
will face formidable (and perhaps unequal) competition from US carriers that have a well
developed hub-and-spoke system. Barrett (1992) also sees hub and airport dominance as
the most important obstacle to contestability in a deregulated aviation market. Hub airport
dominance occurs principally because of the allocation of airport capacity or slots on a
seniority or grandfather rights basis. In Europe, the outright bias on new entrants at
London’s Heathrow airport since 1977 is the most extreme form of grandfather rights. In
the US, Morrison and Winston (1987) found evidence of increasing rents attributable to
dominance of certain key hub airports.
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In Europe with airport extension being precluded by environmental concerns and extension
involving extremely long lead times, the possession of strong positions at these airports
offers incumbent carriers a relatively stable (although constrained) source of economic rent.
Morrison and Winston (1987) found that fares are higher on routes with greater
concentration at airports. Costs could be higher as well due to such factors as greater
congestion and higher landing fees.
Ground handling monopolies
Barrett (1992) found that aircraft and passenger handling costs accounted for 12.2% of
total airline costs in the EC in 1984. He found that in the US most of these services are
supplied by a few airlines authorised by the British Aviation Authority, which wishes to
avoid unnecessary duplication of spaces and handling facilities,. Although at Heathrow an
unusually large number of airlines retain handling rights originally granted many years ago.
New entrants cannot easily establish an independent presence at airports if passenger and
baggage handling are carried out by a rival airline. British Midland stated that from its own
experience of handling at Birmingham, it could have provided the services itself at just over
half the rent it paid at Heathrow. It believed it could have been able to pass on the benefits
of lower handling charges to its customers.
Computer Reservation Systems (CRSs)
In the US over 80% of all tickets purchased are sold by travel agents (Morrison and
Winston 1987). Travel agents do business using CRSs. There are economies of scale in
CRSs and new entrants depend on established CRSs. In the US the CRSs owned by United
and American are used by seventy percent of travel agents. The monopolistic power of
CRS-owning airlines is also reflected in their charges to other airlines for access to the
system. Sinha (1986) found that the return on investment for a CRS ranges from 24% to
95%.
STRATEGIC BARRIERS
Strategic barriers to contestability have more to do with the strategic moves that incumbent
carriers engage in to forestall easy entry.
Mergers and acquisitions
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Leigh (1990) states that from 1987 to 1990, the airline industry in the OECD countries saw
increased oligopolisation. Barrett (1992) echoes the same assertions. In Europe, potential
competitors are being taken over by national airlines thus reducing contestability of the
market. The traditional collusion on prices and capacity between national airlines has been
strengthened by a series of alliances between national airlines. The gains from Anglo-Irish
and Anglo-Dutch deregulation required new market entrants. The need for independent
airlines on European routes is shown in a study of SAS’s monopoly of the Oslo-Stockholm
route. Barrett (1992) estimates that competition on the route could yield fare reductions of
20 to 30%.
Pricing policy
Airlines with large networks can reduce fares selectively in response to new entrants on
contested routes. Kahn (1988) describes this process in the case of Capitol Airways as
follows:
“I take perverse satisfaction in having predicted the demise of price-cutting competitors like
Capitol Airways and we still did nothing to limit the predictable geographically
discriminatory response of the incumbent carriers to their entry, and having rejected the
conventional wisdom that predation would not pay because any attempt to raise fares after the
departure of the price-cutting newcomers would elicit instantaneous competitive re-entry”
(Kahn 1988:319).
It must be noted that aviation is produced as a network of services. It is unlikely that a
network entrant will be able to enter the entire network of an incumbent airline. The scope
is thus created for geographical price discrimination between routes with and without new
entrants. Another source of funds for geographical price discrimination arises when airlines
have different regulatory regimes. An airline might face full competition on some routes and
participate in high-fare revenue sharing on others. It is thus able to subsidise its
competition-facing routes. This would be typically the case in common aviation markets.
The welfare gains in the liberalised markets will typically translate to losses in the regulated
extra-single aviation markets. Barrett (1992) provides an example of how between 1987
and 1989 only two routes from Dublin to other EC capital cities had reductions in their
economy fares. Madrid had a 10% reduction and the London fare was almost halved.
Economy fares to other cities increased. The Dublin - London route experienced new
market entry while others were operated in collusion by established national airlines.
Geographical price discrimination therefore developed a widening margin between a
contested and uncontested route. The absence of market entry was associated with high
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fares. Europe’s charter airlines charge between 32% and 37% of the scheduled airline
airfares and typically face less strict market entry difficulties than scheduled services.
WILL SINGLE AVIATION MARKETS BE PROTECTIONIST?
The history of international aviation has not been one of competition. To the contrary, it
has been one of collusion and parallel behaviour. The scheduled airlines’ main source of
profit has always been carrying business passengers on international scheduled services. It is
a price sensitive market and so competition was always going to appear in the form of
scheduling and service standards and price cutting (Tugendhart 1992).
Applying contestability theory to international aviation presents problems. Entry and exit
are restricted by bilateral arrangements. Even where more liberalised bilaterals have been
negotiated, national regulations sometimes require entrants to publicly disclose their
strategy thus giving incumbents a competitive edge. The airport constraints, technological
differences and price retaliations by incumbents leads to an a priorirejection of this model
for international trade in aviation services. Nonetheless, we will examine the barriers to
multilateral competition in aviation services focusing particularly on how single aviation
markets will impact on this sector of the industry.
In both Europe and Australasia, the incumbent airlines will strengthen their positions before
the formation of single aviation markets. A privatised Qantas is soon to merge with
Australian Airlines. In Europe, mergers and acquisitions are currently taking place.
Collusion on prices and capacity between national airlines has been strengthened by a series
of alliances between national airlines, the notable ones being the acquisition of UTA and Air
Inter by Air France which reduced the remaining independent French airlines to 3% of
scheduled aviation performed by French airlines. KLM acquired a controlling interest in
Transavia to achieve a 97% share of Dutch aviation. The collapse of German Wings gave
Lufthansa a 98% share of scheduled aviation by German carriers. British Airways (BA)
took over British Caledonian in 1987 to bring BA’s share of scheduled aviation to 90%. In
Italy, Denmark and Greece, national carriers dominate aviation (Barrett 1992).
In 1990, British Airways was involved with KLM to each acquire 20% of the proposed
Sabena Airways (SWA). SWA was to succeed the Belgian carrier, Sabena, which was then
undergoing a major financial restructuring to stem mounting losses. The deal would have
created an airline serving seventy-five European cities from a Brussels hub, but it was called
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off amidst wrangling over government approvals as Sabena’s financial situation worsened.
British Airways has since acquired a stake in the restructured carrier.
As Europe moves towards liberalisation, a number of national airlines are taking strategic
equity stakes in smaller operators and forging alliances across continents. British Airways
for instance has submitted an indicative bid for a privatised Qantas. The liberalisation of
some of the bilateral agreements between Great Britain and the Netherlands, Britain and
West Germany, Britain and Luxembourg, Britain and Belgium, Britain and Singapore, and
Britain and Switzerland, has raised some hopes for improved performance of the non-US
airline industry. Some commentators, however, see mergers and strategic alliances as
having a negative impact on the contestability of markets. Morrison and Winston concluded
that in the USA:
“Mergers have not diminished competition on high-density routes enough to threaten to erase
deregulation's benefits, but by substantially foreclosing the possibility of increased
competition on low to medium density routes, mergers have made it even less likely that
deregulation will reach its full potential” (Morrison and Winston 1989:83).
Since European aviation has few routes that are high density by North American standards,
the anti-competitive impact of mergers will be greater. Mergers entail the use or monopoly
of computer reservation systems and greater down and upstream integration by the merged
carriers. It is posited that this raises the barriers to entry and makes operations for those
already in the market much more onerous. Kahn states:
“The increasing sophistication with which the leading carriers - particularly the ones with the
most fully developed computer reservation systems - have learned to practice what the
industry euphemistically calls "yield management" has enabled them to take full advantage of
that monopoly power while also creating possible insurmountable barriers to entry by truly
new competitors” (Kahn 1990:348).
It would be inappropriate to pre-judge what Europe ‘93 will entail for foreign carriers. But
the indications are that the contestability of the market will be lessened by the mergers and
strategic alliances currently taking place. The EC’s third package will “constitute the final
phase in the organisation of the Community air transport market” (Pilling 1992:19).
The proposals are for common airline licensing, approval of fifth freedom in the EC,
approval of cabotage in EC, removal of route capacity limitations, fare setting freedom,
allocation of landing/take-off slots, and the EC to negotiate air service agreements with
foreign countries. There is a general feeling that the EC will take a defensive posture with
regards to foreign airlines. There is already some evidence of this, with the Commission
urging flag carriers to defer re-negotiation of bilaterals that put the EC carriers at a
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“disadvantage” against North American carriers. The allocation of landing/take-off rights is
another source of concern for foreign carriers who feel that the EC would tend to favour its
own carriers.
Annex IV of the EC third package deals with third country carriers. It explicitly prohibits
price leadership by non-EC airlines for intra-EC trips. It also establishes the applicability of
EC competition legislation to non-EC airlines on routes to, from, and within the
Community and the code of conduct for computer reservation systems (CRSs). The
defensive nature of the proposed package is captured in the Annex:
“The Community should avoid diminishing the value of the traffic rights credited by the
Community legislation within the internal aviation market for Community air carriers”
(Pilling 1992:21).
A number of foreign carriers from outside Europe currently do not have fifth freedom
rights. It is therefore hard to envisage many of the carriers gaining them after the EC takes
over the negotiations.
Single aviation markets often mean the removal of intra-single market duty free sales which
is likely to lead to a substantial reduction in airport revenues. This may mean airport
authorities may increase charges to airlines in an attempt to recoup lost revenue. Such
moves are likely to impose higher costs on third country airlines.
The scarcity of runway space, gate frontage and slots in Europe, the US and Australasian
markets will give home country carriers an advantage over those of third countries.
On the whole, it appears that single aviation markets will create barriers to multilateral
competition. They will become large “domestic” markets within which trade is restricted. It
sounds almost tautological that trade as opposed to autarky leads to global welfare
maximisation. A motive towards multilateral liberalisation in aviation services would be
improved airline industry efficiency, but also implies benefits from trade - great welfare
improvement associated with greater exchange in the service. Weisman (1990) shows that
domestic welfare increases if a domestic route is liberalised even if the competition comes
from a non-domestic entrant. But he cautions:
“It must be remembered that liberal bilaterals or multilateral agreements are only as liberal as
market actors permit. Collusion behaviour still violates the spirit of [such] policy initiatives”
(Weisman 1990:158).
We now turn to the issues that should concern policy makers in single aviation markets.
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ISSUES FOR POLICY MAKERS
Contestability theory has been labelled a “theorist’s toy and a trivial case” and “a theory
urgently in search of facts” (Shepherd 1984). Yet Baumol et al. (1982) say the trick is for
regulators to adopt policies that enhance the contestability of markets. They say there might
be a need to regulate access rules for example, by requiring the leasing of shared use of
sunk cost facilities. They claim that mergers and consolidations can be evaluated on the
basis of how they will affect structural contestability in the industry.
Perhaps the most important source of non-contestability may be found in the dramatic
changes in route network structure that characterised the post-deregulation period. The
question may be asked whether regulators should not be concerned about the hub-and-
spoke system as a major barrier to contestability. A possible option would be for policy
makers to discard contestability theory and use a network approach instead. Also, more
vigorous anti-trust enforcement may be needed than has been practiced in the past. This will
help mitigate the anti-competitive features of the emerging oligopolies. Because the largest
consumer benefits occur in markets with three or more carriers, the effect that mergers or
acquisitions would have on the ability of three or more carriers to compete in over hub
traffic would serve as a test of the anti-competitive features of proposed mergers and
acquisitions.
A major barrier to contestability in single aviation markets will be infrastructure. Barrett
(1992) recommends the transfer of the slot allocation function from scheduling committees
of incumbents to airport management, thus ending the grandfather rights of older airlines.
There should be more investment in airport capacity. Other measures include slot lotteries,
or buying and selling of slots with ring fences for categories such as regional services, new
entrant airlines or other target categories.
Barrett (1992) suggests that an open market in handling at airports should be permitted.
The case advanced by some regulations is that this would lead to an increase in the number
of ground vehicles on the airport aprons. But this makes no sense as the number of vehicles
to handle each aircraft need not affect the overall efficiency of the system. A parking levy
could be raised for vehicles not in use.
Carriers owning computer reservation systems (CRSs) are said to have market power. The
more radical solutions that have been suggested are to regulate the CRS industry or to
require divestiture so that no airline may own a CRS. Fees have to be non-discriminatory
and cost-related. CRS vendors should rank flights by departure time or arrival time for non-
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stop direct flights with the addition of elapsed journey time for stopping direct flights and
connecting flights. At present, there are no laws on the operation of CRSs in Australasia,
Europe and US-Canada markets. Providing travel agents with the ability to shift freely
among CRSs would give the CRS owners less of a competitive advantage. Better consumer
information about the presence of commission overrides would reduce potential biases in
information provided by agents.
Price surveillance can be advocated on the grounds that:
“It is not possible in principle to reject the imposition of a price ceiling to protect travellers
subject to monopolistic exploitation, where restoration of a more effective competition process
seems infeasible” (Kahn 1990:349).
The danger with price surveillance however, is that once introduced, direct regulation has
both a logical and almost irresistible tendency to spread (Kahn 1990).
Code sharing appears to inhibit competition in the commuter segment of the industry.
Prohibiting alliances between major or national carriers and regional carriers may only
encourage the acquisition of the smaller carriers and thereby hasten industry concentration.
A number of experts are in agreement that contestability within single aviation markets is
threatened by a number of barriers to both entry and exit. This then brings into question the
issue of how policy makers should proceed. Is it necessary or worthwhile to use
contestability theory as a policy tool or should policy makers resort to the well established
market-structure-conduct theories ? Our view is that the latter provide a sound basis for
formulating policies. They present the policy maker with the most likely scenarios.
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to highlight the shortcomings of contestability theory in analysing
industry structure and competition in civil aviation. Barriers to contestability in the industry
are many and policy makers have to address these in order to maximise welfare benefits.
Single aviation markets are being formed in many regions of the world and as airlines
prepare for these, there have been mergers that will reduce competition both within and
outside of aviation markets. Contestability theory would want to put these through the
“burden test”. Some of the mergers may not be opposed as the threat of entry would
supposedly act as prefect. Herein lies our point of departure with the theory. Empirical
evidence has shown that airline markets are not perfectly contestable. Consolidation in the
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industry has resulted in welfare losses that were previously derived from deregulation in the
US. Policy makers who have been influenced by contestability theory have assumed an
indifferent attitude towards mergers.
Policy makers, whilst endeavouring to make single markets as contestable as possible,
should not take the theory wholesale. The structure of the markets as it currently pertains
should be a key consideration. The structure of the market is generally what determines
industry rivalry and as such should form a major input in policy formulation.
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